Multimodal models
Models that read or produce images, audio or video, and attacks that hide inside those inputs.
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29 items
PrivMark: Pixel-Space Steering against Privacy Leakage in Vision-Language Models
Nov 7, 2026InfoResearchPreprintPrivacyResearchPrivMark is a framework that suppresses soft-biometric leakage, such as age, gender, and race, from vision-language models by adding a bounded pixel-space perturbation to the image. It combines two steering vector directions in hidden-state space, one for incidental disclosure under open-ended descriptions and one for compliance with direct biometric probes. Across three white-box source models it reaches up to 85.9% biometric suppression while keeping 75% of clean OK-VQA utility, and the perturbations transfer to seven unseen VLMs, including closed-source APIs.
Arxiv (cs.RO + cs.CV security)Context-Shielded Backdoor Attack against Large Vision-Language Models
Oct 31, 2026InfoResearchPreprintSecurityResearchResearchers report that visual-token compression in large vision-language models can unmask a hidden backdoor. The authors identify context stripping, where pruning removes clean visual tokens that otherwise suppress an embedded trigger. They propose StripWake, a projector-only backdoor that stays at 0.4% attack success rate under full-token inference on LLaVA-1.5-7B, yet reaches 94.0%-99.7% across five primary compressors without CIDEr loss.
Arxiv (cs.RO + cs.CV security)Vulnerabilities and Defenses in Audio-Visual Attacks: A Survey From Audio to Multimodal Models
Oct 31, 2026InfoResearchPeer-reviewedSecurityResearchThis survey, published in ACM Computing Surveys (Volume 59, Issue 1, pages 1-34, January 2027), reviews vulnerabilities and defenses in audio-visual attacks, spanning audio-only systems through multimodal models. The source text provided contains only the publication citation, so no further findings or methods are described.
ACM Digital Library (TOPS, DTRAP, CSUR)Textual Response-Aware Guidance for Zero-Shot Adversarial Robustness of Vision-Language Models
Oct 29, 2026InfoResearchPreprintSecurityResearchThis research examines zero-shot adversarial robustness in vision-language models (VLMs), which remain vulnerable to adversarial attacks. The authors show that two existing forms of pre-trained model guidance, matching visual features and matching prediction distributions, each have limitations that can degrade zero-shot performance. They propose Textual Response-Aware Guidance (TRAG), which constrains visual representation drift using the pre-trained text encoder's responses to local input variations, and report state-of-the-art clean and robust performance across architectures and tasks.
Arxiv (cs.RO + cs.CV security)Textual Response-Aware Guidance for Zero-Shot Adversarial Robustness of Vision-Language Models
Oct 29, 2026InfoResearchPreprintSecurityResearchResearchers study zero-shot adversarial robustness of vision-language models, which remain vulnerable to adversarial attacks despite strong generalization. They analyze visual representation drift in two existing forms of pre-trained model guidance, feature matching and prediction-distribution matching, and find complementary limitations. They propose Textual Response-Aware Guidance (TRAG), which constrains visual representation drift using the pre-trained text encoder's responses to local input variations, and report state-of-the-art clean and robust performance across architectures and tasks.
Arxiv (cs.RO + cs.CV security)Depth-Dependent Safety Geometry in Vision-Language Models: Layer-Wise Localization and Bidirectional Refusal Control
Oct 23, 2026InfoResearchPreprintResearchSafetyResearchers present a lightweight inference-time framework for localizing and steering safety-sensitive representations in frozen vision-language models, without retraining. On Qwen3-VL-4B, steering along a learned safety direction in early vision layers gives bidirectional refusal control, with unsafe rejection spanning 6%-96%. The authors report that deeper layers stay separable along that direction yet respond little to steering, and that InternVL2.5-4B shows similar depth-dependent geometry.
Arxiv (cs.CR + cs.CL + cs.LG)Label-Budgeted Attribute Inference from Protected Features in Edge-Cloud Split Multimodal LLMs
Oct 22, 2026InfoResearchPreprintSecurityPrivacyResearchResearchers show that in edge-cloud split inference of multimodal LLMs, an honest-but-curious server can infer age, gender and race from the intermediate features it receives, even when raw images stay local. They propose a label-budgeted recovery curve to measure feature-level privacy, finding that Safe-LLaVA, which filters model responses, still lets a server recover 75-85% of unprotected leakage from transmitted features with 20 labeled samples per class.
Arxiv (cs.CR + cs.CL + cs.LG)Can Quantum Layers offer Performance and Security Advantages in Vision-Language Models?
Oct 20, 2026InfoResearchPreprintResearchSecurityThis study tests classically simulated quantum layers in the LLaVA-OneVision vision-language model, using 4- and 8-qubit circuits inserted at or replacing classical components. On the Visual Spatial Reasoning dataset, a quantum layer inserted after the visual projector reached 80.7% development accuracy, 2.28 percentage points above classical full fine-tuning. Replacing the final decoder feed-forward sublayer kept 79.22% accuracy with 13.07 million fewer trainable parameters, though benefits depend strongly on placement.
Arxiv (cs.CR + cs.CL + cs.LG)MMA-SafetyBench: A Benchmark for Multimodal Agent Safety Evaluation
Oct 13, 2026InfoResearchPreprintSecurityResearchMMA-SafetyBench is a benchmark for testing whether multimodal agents can be steered off their authorized task by deceptive visual interface elements, such as forged system alerts. The benchmark contains 1,083 adversarial trajectories across five domains, and across nine evaluated models the Attack Success Rate reaches 87.96% while the Semantic Compromise Rate reaches 98.09%. Attacks persisted under neutral prompts, and a safety-priority prompt lowered the Attack Success Rate without eliminating the failure mode.
Arxiv (cs.CR + cs.CL + cs.LG)Detecting Adversarial Images through Response Profiles of Vision-Language Models
Oct 7, 2026InfoResearchPreprintSecurityResearchThe paper proposes a detector that identifies adversarial images for frozen vision-language models by profiling how an image responds to a set of general semantic prompts. The profile combines category-level statistics, prompt relationships, deviations from clean reference distributions, and stability under weak image transformations, and a lightweight classifier labels each input while the VLM stays fixed. Evaluated across multiple datasets, CLIP-style backbones and several attack families, the detector discriminates strongly in attack-specific settings and retains substantial performance on unseen attacks.
Arxiv (cs.RO + cs.CV security)Purifying Backdoored Large Vision-Language Models by Removing Hijacked Directions
Oct 7, 2026InfoResearchPreprintSecurityResearchResearchers propose OrthoPurify, a method that removes backdoors from large vision-language models (LVLMs) by applying a one-step orthogonal projection to the backdoored weight updates. The method identifies the backdoor as "direction hijacking," where a small number of weight update directions are diverted from task adaptation to encode a backdoor shortcut. A pseudo-benign reference model, fine-tuned on a small set of clean samples, is used to isolate these hijacked directions. The authors report that OrthoPurify reduces attack success rate to near zero while preserving original performance, without retraining or inference-time overhead.
Fix: OrthoPurify: a one-step orthogonal projection on the weight update that removes hijacked directions, using a pseudo-benign reference model obtained by fine-tuning the pretrained weights on a small set of clean samples. Code is available at https://github.com/womeimingzi/OrthoPurify.
Arxiv (cs.RO + cs.CV security)Vulnerabilities and Defenses in Audio-Visual Attacks: A Survey From Audio to Multimodal Models
Oct 4, 2026InfoResearchPeer-reviewedSecurityResearchThis survey reviews attacks on audio-visual multimodal large language models (MLLMs), covering adversarial, backdoor and jailbreak attacks. It notes that researchers often fine-tune public open-source MLLMs, which introduces security risks, and that existing surveys address only specific attack types. The paper also reviews attacks against the latest audio-visual MLLMs and outlines challenges and trends for future research on attacks and defenses. Published in ACM Computing Surveys on 2026-10-05.
OpenAlex (peer-reviewed AI security)Image-embedded prompt injection vulnerability of vision-language models in dental radiology: a cross-vendor attack–defense evaluation
Oct 2, 2026InfoResearchPeer-reviewedSecurityResearchResearchers evaluated image-embedded prompt injection, where adversarial text is rendered into medical image pixels, against four vision-language models (GPT-4o, Gemini 2.5 Flash, Claude Sonnet 4.5, MedGemma 4B) using 270 dental panoramic radiographs from the DenTeX dataset. All four models were vulnerable, with paired attack success rates up to 62.6% (95% CI: 58.5–66.7%) for GPT-4o. Among five benchmarked defenses, OCR-based text sanitization achieved the strongest reduction (pooled ASR: 0.2%), while the provenance-aware ProvDent defense escalates suspicious cases for human review and kept clean-image F1 within 0.6 percentage points of baseline.
Fix: OCR-based text sanitization achieved the strongest attack reduction (pooled ASR: 0.2%). The provenance-aware ProvDent defense provides a complementary fail-open mechanism that escalates suspicious cases for human review.
OpenAlex (peer-reviewed AI security)Corrupted but Correct: Why Vision-Language Models Lie to Themselves Internally
Oct 2, 2026InfoResearchPreprintSecurityResearchResearchers report that a targeted adversarial perturbation can drive a vision-language model's teacher-forced training loss for a fixed target caption near zero, while free generation on Qwen2.5-VL-7B-Instruct still yields the correct description. Using 200 held-out COCO images and a two-stage PGD attack, they localise the gap to one autoregressive step and across the 28 LLM decoder layers, finding that the language decoder, not the visual encoder, differentially arbitrates which images are corrupted (linear probe AUC=0.858, flagged for circularity). The authors argue that adversarial robustness in autoregressive VLMs depends mainly on the language decoder's prior.
Arxiv (cs.RO + cs.CV security)It Takes Little to Rewrite Perception: Targeted Semantic Substitution in Vision-Language Models at $ε\leq 4/255$
Sep 29, 2026InfoResearchPreprintSecurityResearchResearchers show that targeted semantic substitution can make vision-language models (VLMs) perceive a different target than the source image within an adversarial perturbation budget of ε ≤ 4/255, a range where prior representation-alignment attacks achieved limited success. Under a white-box threat model, the source image's token streams are aligned with the target's in the victim VLM's post-merger token space. Under a strict success criterion, complete replacement reaches 38% on images at ε = 4/255 and 35.9% on video at ε = 1/255.
Arxiv (cs.RO + cs.CV security)Selective Channel Restoration for Backdoored Vision-Language Models
Sep 29, 2026InfoResearchPreprintSecurityResearchResearchers propose Perturb-Select-Restore (PSR), a post-training defense against backdoors in vision-language models (VLMs) implanted through poisoned fine-tuning data. PSR performs sparse updates to the projection interface and adds no computation at inference time. The authors report that backdoored VLM projectors are more sensitive to bounded perturbations than clean ones, a property they call projection fragility, and PSR reduces attack success rates to near zero while preserving clean-task performance.
Fix: PSR, a post-training defense that identifies the output channels most sensitive to perturbations in each projection layer of a backdoored VLM and restores their parameters to the corresponding pretrained values.
Arxiv (cs.RO + cs.CV security)Narrow Multimodal Fine-Tuning Can Induce Emergent Misalignment
Sep 28, 2026InfoResearchPreprintSafetyResearchResearchers study emergent misalignment (EM) in vision-language models, where fine-tuning on narrow multimodal tasks causes broadly harmful behavior. Across fifteen commercial and open-source models, narrow multimodal fine-tuning induced misaligned behavior that transferred to unrelated tasks, including visual factual dishonesty, unsafe image generation, visual jailbreak vulnerability and risky agentic actions. The authors report that EM arises under both supervised fine-tuning and preference optimization and is sensitive to training-evaluation modality alignment.
Fix: Prompt inoculation, benign continued training, and activation-level steering were explored and can partially reduce EM.
Arxiv (cs.RO + cs.CV security)Empirical Analysis of Goal Hijacking in Large Vision-Language Models via Visual Prompt Injection
Sep 27, 2026InfoResearchPeer-reviewedSecurityResearchResearchers study visual prompt injection (VPI), where instructions embedded in input images are followed by large vision-language models (LVLMs). They propose "goal hijacking via visual prompt injection" (GHVPI), which redirects an LVLM from its original task to an attacker-specified one. Their quantitative analysis reports an attack success rate of 15.8% against GPT-4V, and they find GHVPI success depends on the character recognition and instruction-following capabilities of LVLMs.
OpenAlex (peer-reviewed AI security)TUBench: Benchmark Large Vision-Language Models on Trustworthiness With Unanswerable Questions
Aug 20, 2026InfoResearchPeer-reviewedResearchSafetyResearchers introduce TUBench, a benchmark that tests Large Vision-Language Models on unanswerable questions built from natural images, code snippets, geometry diagrams and statistical tables. They evaluated 39 foundational models, and GPT-5 reached the highest average accuracy at 83.2% in judging answerability. Manual analysis found GPT-5 gave both a correct answer and explanation in only 63% of cases, with hallucinations causing 87.9% of its incorrect explanations.
IEEE Xplore (Security & AI Journals)ThreatsDay: Android Spyware, PLC Attacks, AI Image Prompt Injection + 12 More Stories
Jul 23, 2026MediumNewsSecurityResearchGitHub will begin rejecting command-line support bundle uploads from older GHES appliances starting August 18, 2026, unless they are patched. A separate npm package, @copilot-mcp/apex, acts as a postinstall dropper that installs a macOS infostealer, and a fake VS Code extension, "Markdown All Pro", impersonates Markdown All in One to beacon machine details and fetch remote payloads.
Fix: To avoid disruption when submitting support bundles, update your GHES instance to the latest patch release available for your current version line. At minimum, the required patch versions are: 3.21.3, 3.20.5, 3.19.9, 3.18.12, and 3.17.18.
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