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InfoResearchPreprintLLM-specific

Log-To-Leak: Prompt Injection Attacks on Tool-Using LLM Agents via the Model Context Protocol

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Summary

This research paper studies Log-To-Leak, an additive post-hoc logging attack in which injected MCP tool-description metadata induces a separate attacker-controlled call after the final legitimate call, leaking the user query, MCP server name, server response, and agent response. Across five MCP servers and four LLM agents, the attack achieved an attack success rate of 62.64-100% and conditional logging accuracy of 76.55-95.64% on 18 valid model-server pairs, while legitimate task completion changed by at most 6.63 percentage points in 16 pairs. Three evaluated defenses left residual ASR above 55% on GitHub MCP with GPT-4o, and an instruction detector flagged 85.53% of benign descriptions.

Mitigation

The paper motivates host-controlled authorization for secondary tool calls.