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InfoResearchPeer-reviewed

Forgery-Resistant Range Queries via Multi-Client Order-Revealing Encryption

Published
Record updated

Summary

The paper shows that two multi-client order-revealing encryption schemes, m-ORE and om-ORE, are vulnerable to a ciphertext-forgery attack. A colluding malicious client and server can silently inject counterfeit records into the encrypted dataset. The authors propose MORES, which they say preserves range-query functionality while provably resisting arbitrarily malicious participants and reduces query size and comparison cost by roughly one-third relative to both schemes.

Mitigation

MORES is proposed as the replacement scheme, described as an immediate drop-in replacement for encrypted-database systems. No patch, configuration change or workaround for m-ORE or om-ORE is stated.