InfoResearchPreprintLLM-specific
Prevented is Not Protected: What Attack Success Rate Hides about RAG
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Summary
This paper examines defenses against knowledge poisoning in Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG), which are usually scored by attack success rate (ASR). The authors introduce Aligned RAG Evaluation, a matched-query protocol that compares clean and poisoned responses with and without defense, using matched conditions analysis, LLM-judge endorsement, and retrieval dependence controls. Experiments on HotpotQA and Natural Questions show that existing defenses can introduce unexpected target-positive answers even while preventing some attacks, and that evaluation criteria can change defense rankings.
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