GHSA-6pr9-rp53-2pmc: vLLM: OOM Denial of Service via Audio Decompression Bomb

Summary

vLLM's `/v1/audio/transcriptions` endpoint limits the compressed upload size but not the decoded PCM output, so a 25MB OPUS file expands to about 14.9GB of float32 PCM at decode time, tested on v0.19.0. An unauthenticated attacker can exhaust server memory with a few concurrent requests, each a valid upload within the documented limit, because the audio decoder in `audio.py` accumulates all frames without a size check and `np.concatenate` allocates a second contiguous array.

Mitigation

A fix was merged in https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/44970

Affected packages in the Exposure Registry

Matched by package name and ecosystem. Each entry shows whether the package delegates to a language model and how many tracked packages depend on it.

• vllmPyPILLM dependency since 2023-08-25 · 15 tracked dependents

Topics

• Inference infrastructure

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