Security, Privacy, and Trustworthy Design for Retrieval-Augmented Generation Systems

Summary

This structured narrative review synthesizes attacks, defenses, threat models and evaluation practices for retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) systems in work published between 2020 and September 2026, organized by pipeline stage from ingestion through tool execution. It finds that poisoning, extraction, membership inference and indirect prompt injection are distinct but composable threats, and that layered controls spanning provenance, access control, retrieval-time anomaly detection, context isolation, output monitoring and tool permissions are needed. The paper was published in Electronics on 2026-11-11.

Topics

• Prompt injection and jailbreaks
• Retrieval-augmented generation

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