InfoResearchPreprintLLM-specific
Combining Long-Term Memory and LLMs Comes at a High Cost: From Prompt Injection to Persistent Compromise
- Published
- Record updated
Summary
Researchers show that persistent memory features in ChatGPT Instant 5.3, Claude Sonnet 4.6, and Gemini 3 Flash enable memory injection, letting malicious instructions carry across sessions. They report that all NIST attack goals are achievable under their general threat model, including persistent disinformation, harmful content, and simulated offline unresponsiveness. On Claude, shared-memory features let an attacker compromise multiple users in an organization and exfiltrate user prompts.
Mitigation
Derived defense mechanisms from the proposed threat model and foundational cybersecurity principles; the authors state that nearly half of these mitigations remain unimplemented across the target services.
Topics
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