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InfoResearchPreprintLLM-specific

Optional Traps: An Empirical Study of LLM Agents Against Credential Deception and Alert-Driven Revocation

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Summary

This study tests whether deception such as honeypots and canary credentials still works when the attacker is an LLM agent. Across four lab experiments, a 4B-parameter model exported records in 20/20 baseline sessions but 0/20 with hardening alone and 0/20 with hardening plus deception. Deception's measurable value was fast, attributable detection and per-client revocation, not added prevention, and the authors note all results are lab-scale.

Mitigation

Closing real weaknesses, such as removing the leaked service key from the debug endpoint, does the preventive work; the study does not establish a broader fix beyond placing traps on the attacker's path and revoking the offending client on alert.