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Securing Locally Deployed LLM-RAG Assistants: A Cross-Model and Cross-Lingual Evaluation of Indirect Prompt Injection Defenses

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Summary

This study evaluates indirect prompt injection against locally deployed RAG assistants, testing four attack families across five defense configurations (C1–C5) and four local LLMs on a synthetic corpus of 40 documents and 32 queries. In the Llama 3.1 8B experiment, conditional Attack Success Rate fell from 70.4% without defenses (C1) to 22.2% with deterministic post-generation filtering (C5). Context contamination remained the main residual weakness, and the authors note the filter and evaluator share some detection indicators, so post-filter ASR reflects unsafe content left in responses.

Mitigation

Deterministic post-generation filtering (C5), which the authors say supports independent security enforcement, reduced conditional ASR from 70.4% to 22.2% in the Llama 3.1 8B experiment and gave post-filter ASRs of 7.4–22.2% across the four models, with Answer Utility ranging from 21.9% to 62.5%.