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STEAD: Subversion-Resistant Portable Encrypted Data Deduplication With File Sharing
- Published
- Record updated
Summary
This paper analyzes existing server-aided message-locked encryption (MLE) schemes and shows they are open to subverted implementations that can stealthily leak users' data, MLE keys and passwords. It also notes these schemes lack file sharing among users. The authors propose STEAD, a subversion-resistant portable MLE scheme with file sharing, which uses cryptographic reverse firewalls (CRFs) to rerandomize ciphertexts and filter messages. The authors formally prove its security and report comprehensive performance evaluations.
Mitigation
STEAD deploys cryptographic reverse firewalls (CRFs) that rerandomize ciphertexts of MLE keys produced with users' hardened password-derived public keys, and modify users' incoming and outgoing messages during generation of MLE keys and hardened passwords to prevent secret leakage.