Domain-Invariant and Language-Model-Assisted Acoustic Side-Channel Attacks on Keyboards

Summary

Researchers examine whether acoustic side-channel attacks on keyboards, which recover typed text from keystroke sounds captured by a commodity microphone, still work outside idealized lab conditions. The study addresses unseen keyboards, diverse users, noisy environments and compressed transmission channels. The authors report that inference survives these conditions when the acoustic model is made explicitly domain-invariant and its noisy predictions are corrected by a language model.

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