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AI security threats move fast and get buried under hype and noise. Built by an Information Systems Security researcher to help security teams and developers stay ahead of vulnerabilities, privacy incidents, safety research, and policy developments.
FastGPT Authentication Bypass Enables Server-Side Proxying: FastGPT versions before 4.14.9.5 have a critical vulnerability (CVE-2026-34162) where an HTTP testing endpoint lacks authentication and acts as an open proxy, letting unauthenticated attackers make requests on behalf of the FastGPT server. A separate high-severity SSRF vulnerability (CVE-2026-34163) in the same platform's MCP tools endpoints allows authenticated attackers to trick the server into scanning internal networks and accessing cloud metadata services.
Command Injection Flaws Hit MLflow and OpenAI Codex: MLflow's model serving feature has a high-severity command injection vulnerability (CVE-2026-0596) where attackers can insert shell commands through unsanitized model paths when `enable_mlserver=True`. Separately, researchers found a critical vulnerability in OpenAI Codex that could have allowed attackers to steal GitHub tokens (secret credentials for accessing repositories), which OpenAI has since patched.
Prompt Injection Bypasses Safety Controls in Multiple AI Tools: Multiple AI systems are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks (where attackers hide malicious instructions in input to trick the AI): the 1millionbot Millie chatbot (CVE-2026-4399) can be tricked using Boolean logic to bypass restrictions, Sixth's AI terminal tool (CVE-2026-30310) can be fooled into running dangerous commands without user approval, and CrewAI framework vulnerabilities allow attackers to chain exploits and escape sandboxes (restricted environments meant to contain AI actions).
Google Cloud Vertex AI Service Agents Had Excessive Default Permissions: Researchers found that AI agents running on Google Cloud's Vertex AI platform could be weaponized as "double agents" because the default service agent accounts (special accounts that run AI services) had excessive permissions, allowing attackers to steal credentials, access private code repositories, and reach internal infrastructure. Google responded by updating their documentation to better explain how Vertex AI uses resources and accounts.
AI agents in enterprises now perform critical operations like provisioning infrastructure and approving transactions, but they are often not governed as distinct identities—instead inheriting broad privileges from their creators. Traditional identity and access management (IAM, the systems that control who can access what) is insufficient because AI agents are dynamic and can take unpredictable paths to achieve their goals, so a new approach called intent-based permissioning is needed, which checks not just who the agent is but why it is requesting access and whether that purpose justifies the action at that moment.