The classifier judged this item not relevant to AI security, so it is left out of lists, feeds, the API and dataset releases. If that is wrong, report a correction on this page.
Practical Differential Fault Attacks on the GPRS Standard Ciphers
- Published
- Record updated
Summary
Researchers present the first differential fault attack on GEA-like stream ciphers under the random fault model, applied to the GPRS standard ciphers GEA-1 and GEA-2. Their dedicated algorithm locates the exact fault position, recovering the 64-bit secret keys with time complexities of 2^33.807 for GEA-1 and 2^33.858 for GEA-2. Simulated attacks on ChipWhisperer Lite show both ciphers can be broken within sixteen minutes on a common laptop.
Mitigation
Finally, the possible countermeasures are presented to protect the processed data of massive GPRS devices. (The source text does not specify the countermeasures.)