GHSA-g5f9-3xfg-p9mf: Decepticon: Role-boundary forgery via ChatML special-token literals in web crawl output composed into LLM context
Summary
Decepticon is vulnerable to role-boundary forgery when web crawl results containing ChatML special-token literals (special symbols that mark conversation roles in LLM message formatting) are inserted into LLM messages without being neutralized. Attackers can plant malicious tokens in target web pages; when the recon agent scrapes these pages and feeds them to the LLM, the tokens trick the model into treating attacker input as a legitimate new instruction, bypassing security guardrails and enabling arbitrary command execution. The vulnerability affects all 16 specialist agents in Decepticon when using self-hosted or open-source LLM backends (like vLLM or SGLang) that don't filter these literals, though hosted services like OpenAI and Anthropic are currently immune because they strip the literals server-side.
Solution / Mitigation
OpenClaw completed an analogous fix on 2026-04-22 via commit `2514746b3261` (~30 lines, sanitizer applied just before tool-output wrapping), demonstrating the feasibility of application-layer mitigation. The source states that 'Fix responsibility falls squarely on the Agent application layer' and that a sanitizer should be applied 'just before tool-output wrapping' to neutralize special-token literals before they reach the LLM message composition layer.
Vulnerability Details
EPSS: 0.0%
Yes
September 24, 2026
Classification
Affected Vendors
Affected Packages
Related Issues
CVE-2026-63086: text-generation-inference through 3.3.7 contains a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in the OpenAI-compat
CVE-2024-37052: Deserialization of untrusted data can occur in versions of the MLflow platform running version 1.1.0 or newer, enabling
Original source: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-g5f9-3xfg-p9mf
First tracked: September 24, 2026 at 08:01 PM
Classified by LLM (prompt v3) · confidence: 95%